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THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF BASING FIRST AMENDMENT

PROTECTIONS ON THE "PUBLIC INTEREST"
I. INTRODUCTION

Of the many proscriptions on government action in the Constitution,
few are as clearly and simply written as the First Amendment's free
speech clause: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press."' The Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, however, belies this simplicity. While ostensibly building
on the foundation principle of content neutrality, which prohibits
restrictions based on the content or subject matter of speech,2 the Court
has proceeded in a somewhat erratic fashion. Sometimes it has held
certain forms of speech to be outside the protections of the First
Amendment,3 and, at other times, has held such speech to be worthy of
some protection. 4 An example of this judicial uncertainty about the First
Amendment is the doctrine of commercial speech.
More than fifty years ago, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,5 the Supreme
Court created the commercial speech doctrine. The case involved an
entrepreneur convicted of violating a New York City ordinance that
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92,95 (1971) ("[A]bove

all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); see also C. EDWIN
BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8-9 (1989) ("In regulating speech,
the government must be neutral toward different ideas. Content discrimination amounts
to forbidden censorship."); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:A
Threatto Liberty, 59 U. CI. L. REV. 225, 225 (1992) ("Government may not suppress
or regulate speech because it does not like its content-unless it is obscene or
demonstrably defamatory.").
3. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) (listing several
forms of speech which are outside the protection of the First Amendment, including
speech which is lewd and obscene, profane, libelous, and insulting or tending to incite
an immediate breach of the peace, i.e., "fighting words").
4. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (reversing conviction under a
Georgia statute which prohibited use of opprobrious words or abusive language); see also
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1073 (12th ed. 1991) (stating that the
Supreme Court has ceased recognizing broad exceptions to the First Amendment of the
kind listed in Chaplinsky).
5. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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prohibited the public distribution of commercial handbills.6 Because the
ordinance did not prevent the distribution of handbills for public protest, 7
Mr. Chrestensen attempted to circumvent the law by printing his ad on
one side, and a protest against the City Dock Department on the other.'
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the
ordinance constituted an impermissible restriction on free speech.9 In a
brief opinion which cited no precedent,1" the Court stated that it is "clear
that the Constitution imposes no... restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising." 1
While Chrestensen afforded no protection to commercial speech, the
doctrine it introduced" has since evolved to provide certain limited
protection for such speech. 13 In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 4 the Court
promulgated a four part test for analyzing commercial speech cases.'The first step in the analysis, and the threshold issue, is whether the
speech is deceptive or fraudulent. 6 Because the Court has long held that
"[t]he government may ban forms of communication more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it,"1 7 deceptive commercial speech is
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment. If the speech is not
deceptive, the second question is whether the asserted state interest in
regulating the speech is substantial.' 8 If there is a substantial state
6. Id. at 53. The court states that § 318 of the Sanitary Code "forbids distribution
in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter." Id. (The pertinent section
of the ordinance is reproduced at id. n.1.)
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 54.
10. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 627-28 (1990).
11. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
12. See RIcHARD T. KAPLAR, ADVERTISING RoHTs: THE NELECmE FREEDOM
17-18 (1991); see also Kozinski & Banner, supranote 10, at 628.
13. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supranote 10, at 628 (stating that since the mid
1970's, the Supreme Court has granted certain limited protections to commercial speech).
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
15. Id. at 566.

16. Id. at 563-66.
17. Id. at 563.
18. ld. at 564.
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interest, the Court will uphold the regulation only if it directly advances

the state interes 9 and is narrowly tailored to meet that end.'
Thus, while commercial speech has enjoyed greater protections than
those provided under Chrestensen,21 the Supreme Court has never

accorded it the same protection as noncommercial speech.'

This

anomalous dichotomy between commercial and noncommercial speech has
been criticized by several commentators.'
The main thrust of the
criticism is two-fold. First, the clear language of the First Amendment
offers no distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.'
Moreover, neither the constitutional debates nor the framers' intent
provide any insight into whether the First Amendment was meant to
protect commercial speech.'
Indeed, although the framers were well
aware of commercial advertising,' they made no mention of it in their
discussions of the value of free speech or in their deliberations on the First
Amendment.'
19. Id.
20. Id. at 566. This component of the Central Hudson test has recently been
altered. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). Fox
will be discussed infra at notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down a statute which prohibited pharmacy
price advertising on the ground that commercial speech deserves some level of protection
under the First Amendment); see also KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 22 (arguing that
Virginia Pharmacy represents the "high water mark" of protections afforded to
commercial speech).
22. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) ("The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.").
23. See, e.g., KAPLAR, supranote 12, at 18; MIcHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING
AND THE FIRsT AmENDmENT 6-8, 19-25 (1989); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 10, at
628-29; Martin H. Redish, The FirstAmendment in the Marketplace:Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1971).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend L
25. See, e.g., KAPLAR, supranote 12, at 36-38 (pointing out that historians disagree
about whether the framers had any coherent theory of the First Amendment free speech
guarantee, let alone whether they recognized a dichotomy between commercial and noncommercial speech).
26. See id. at 36.
27. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434-36, 440-43, 731, 738 (J. Gales ed. 1789),
reprintedin 5 THE FouNDER'S CONSTrrurroN 128-29 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds.
1987) (quoting James Madison addressing the House of Representatives regarding the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. Madison, while obviously valuing free speech as
necessary to allow the public to become informed as to the workings of its government
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Second, it is virtually impossible to formulate a definition of
commercial speech which adequately distinguishes the types of speech the
Court wants to protect from those it does not.' Indeed, other than the
paradigm case of purely commercial speech-that which does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction,"" such as "I will sell you the X

prescription drug at the Y price"lq-it is difficult to tell exactly what
commercial speech is. The Supreme Court has spent most of its effort
reflecting on what commercial speech is not.31 As the Court has
indicated, speech is not commercial simply because it serves the profit
motive of the speaker, or because money is spent to project it, or because
it solicits to purchase or to contribute money." Yet the Court has both
protected purely commercial speech, 3 and left unprotected speech which
does not fit clearly into either category.' What emerges is the sense that
the Court is proceeding on an ad hoe basis and is, itself, uncertain as to
what exactly commercial speech is.35
and to adequately express its grievances to its representatives, nevertheless made no
distinctions among various forms of speech or stated whether any should be subject to
limitation.); see also KAPLAR, supranote 12, at 36 (pointing out that the framers were
well aware of advertising and the role it played in society); Kozinsky & Banner, supra
note 10, at 632-33 (arguing that even if the framers did not intend, specifically, to protect
commercial speech, there are many forms of speech they did not specifically intend to
protect which are nonetheless afforded full protection under the First Amendment).
28. See KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 51; Kozinsky & Banner, supranote 10, at 63445; cf.Redish, supra note 23, at 431 (arguing that the Court's attempts to separate
"commercial speech from traditionally protected categories of speech [have] been
onerous." Expression does not come in "neat, severable units" as the Court's approach
indicates, but rather there is "no adequate justification for omitting certain types of
commercial speech from the scope of the First Amendment....").
29. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
30. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (citations omitted).
31. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 10, at 637.
32. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
33. See id. at 761-62, 771-73.
34. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535-37 (1987) (classifying the word "Olympic" as primarily
commercial and allowing its use to be restricted by the U.S. Olympic Committee);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding the suspension
of an attorney who engaged in soliciting clients in person).
35. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 10, at 631.
[G]overnment cannot prohibit certain sorts of commercial billboards, but can
prohibit the unauthorized use of certain words altogether. Government cannot
prohibit the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements, but can
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The purpose of this note, however, is not to analyze the
commercial/noncommercial dichotomy. That has been done by several
noted commentators' sufficiently to lead one to recognize, as the present
author does, that the dichotomy is unfounded both in law and in fact.
Rather, this note will examine the commercial speech doctrine in an
attempt to discern a governing principle behind the Court's decisions.
What is most significant about the commercial speech line of cases is
not that the Court has failed to protect speech which would fall within
First Amendment protections absent the dichotomy, but on what grounds
the Court has justified the little protections it has accorded to such
speech.37 This note will argue that the Supreme Court's intermediate
scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech merely weighs the public
interest, as perceived by the Court, against the state interest, as asserted
by the government. Any individual rights to speak and to exchange
information, arguably what the First Amendment protects, are lost in the
process. Part HItraces the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine
since Chrestensen. This part will emphasize that without a basis for the
commercial/noncommercial dichotomy,3 8 the Court has created a
balancing test which, by placing essentially the same interest on both sides
of the scale, affords little protection to commercial speech.39 Part HI
will critically analyze the Supreme Court's utilitarian basis for commercial
speech protections in an attempt to illustrate its weaknesses, and Part IV
will suggest some of the negative implications of the Court's current
approach to commercial speech cases.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRNE

The analysis in this part will reflect the rough division of commercial
speech cases on the threshold issue of whether the speech is purportedly
misleading. Thus, Part A will trace the development of the law governing
concedediy nondeceptive commercial speech, and Part B will trace the
prohibit advertisements for casino gambling. Government cannot require
professional fundraisers to obtain licenses, but can prohibit college students
from holding Tupperware parties in their dormitories.
Id. (citations omitted).
36. See supra notes 10, 12, 23 and accompanying text.
37. See HENRY MARK HOLZER, SWEEr LAND O1 LmERTY? THE SuPREm COURT
AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 72 (1983) (arguing that the significant aspect of Virginia
Phannacy is that the Court based its protection of commercial speech on society's need
for information, rather than the individual's right to speak, thus opening the door to
revoking protection where the Court deems that society does not need the information).
38. See KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 17-18.
39. See infra Part II.A.3.
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Court's analysis of those cases in which the deceptive nature of the speech
was in question.
A. Nondeceptive Commercial Speech
The Chrestensen decision left commercial speech devoid of any First
Amendment protections,' but it was not long after that decision that the
Court began to see some of the problems presented by the
commercial/noncommercial distinction.41 However, it was not until 1973
that the Court began planting the seeds from which the modem
commercial speech doctrine would eventually grow.
1. The Emergence and Development of the First Amendment Interest:
From Pittsburgh Press to Virginia Pharmacy
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,4' the Court considered whether an ordinance that prohibited
newspapers from carrying employment advertisements in columns
designated by gender' was a violation of the First Amendment." After
finding that such speech was clearly commercial speech,' the Court
proceeded to consider whether it was entitled to protections previously
unavailable to speech' that "do[es] no more than propose a commercial
transaction." 47 The Court refused to abandon the commercial speech
distinction," and did not resolve the issue as to what protections were
afforded such speech under the First Amendment. Instead, the Court held
that because employers could use the gender-based employment listings to
further the discriminating hiring practices banned by the ordinance, the
advertising itself could be banned. That is, because the commercial
40. See supranotes 9-11 and accompanying text.

41. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (referring to Chrestensenas a "casual, almost offhand" decision and stating

that "it has not survived reflection").
42. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
43. Id. at 377-78.
44. Id. at 381.
45. Id. at 385.
46. See id. at 386 (noting that Chrestensen held commercial speech to be

unprotected under the First Amendment).
47. Id. at 385; see also KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 18-19 (stating that this
characterization in Pittsburgh Presshas come to be known as the "classic definition of
commercial speech").
48. PittsburghPress, 413 U.S. at 388.
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activity advertised was illegal under the ordinance, advertising based on

such activity was not protected speech.49
What is significant about the PittsburghPress decision in the current
context is that the Court chose to characterize the issue as one in which
commercial speech must serve a specific function in order to be protected
under the First Amendment.'
In justifying its holding, the Court

maintained that
[a]ny First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might

arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the
regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself

is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid
limitation on economic activity."1

Thus, commercial speech is not protected for its own sake, or for the

sake of the speaker; instead, it must serve some "First Amendment
interest" in order to outweigh the state interest in prohibiting it, and to

receive constitutional protection.52 What this First Amendment interest
might consist of would not begin to become evident for another year.
In 1975, the Court decided its next significant commercial speech
case, Bigelow v. Virginia.s

Bigelow involved a challenge by a

newspaper to a Virginia statuteM that made it a misdemeanor to
"encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion."'

The newspaper

was convicted under the statute for running an ad which notified women
49. Id. at 388-89 (pointing out that "sex discrimination in ... employment has been
declared illegal under... the ordinance," the Court analogized to advertisements for
prostitution or narcotics and noted that these would likewise be unprotected under the
Constitution).
50. The Court did not define the issue as protecting the speaker's right to speak
freely and as he so chooses. The distinction, then, is rooted in protecting speech as a
right of the speaker, versus protecting it as a means to social utility, as the Court seems
to be alluding to in PittsburghPress. For an illuminating discussion of this distinction,
see HOLZER, supra note 37, at 65-90; see also Murray I. Franck, An Analysis and
Review of Cable Television and the FirstAmendment, 7 Comm. & LAW 65, 65-66 (Dec.
1988) (book review).
51. PittsburghPress, 413 U.S. at 389.
52. See supra note 50.
53. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Michie 1960) (quoted in Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 81213).
55. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811.
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that abortions were legal and available in New York.' The issue for the
Supreme Court was whether the statute violated the First Amendment.'
The Court began by rejecting the Virginia Supreme Court's
assumption, relying on Chrestensen, that commercial advertisements
received no First Amendment protection. 8 As in Pittsburgh Press,
however,
the Court again refused to abandon the
commercial/noncommercial distinction. Instead, the Court found a way
to further narrow the Chrestensen commercial speech doctrine and to
protect the speech in question, while still maintaining the commercial
speech distinction."
In Chrestensen, the speech was that which did "no more than propose
a commercial transaction."
But in Bigelow, the Court found that the
speech served an important First Amendment interest. As the Court
noted:
The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper
contained factual material of clear 'public interest.' . . . [T]he
advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value
to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly in need of the
services offered, but also to those with a ...genuine interest in
the subject matter or the law of another State ... and to readers
seeking reform in Virginia.... Also, the activity advertised
pertained to constitutional interests. Thus,... appellant's First
Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional interests of
the general public. 6
The Court then proceeded to balance this First Amendment interest against
the asserted state interest in maintaining quality medical care within its
borders.62 Because the activity advertised was perfectly legal in New
56. See id. at 812. The ad was placed by the Women's Pavilion of New York City
and said that they would help women with unwanted pregnancies to obtain "immediate
placement in accredited hospitals and clinics at low cost." Id.
57. Id. at 811.

58. Id. at 818.
59. See id. at 819-21.
60. id. at 820-21.
61. Id. at 822 (citations omitted). By "constitutional interest," the Court was
referring to a woman's right to choose an abortion as expressed in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
62. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826-28.
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York, and would not be occurring in Virginia,' the Court found this
interest insufficient to justify the regulation."
Thus, the Court began to tie the First Amendment interest to the
public interest, and to define it not only in terms of the numbers of
individuals the speech serves,' but also in terms of the "constitutional
interest" content of the speech.' Against this First Amendment interest,
the Court then weighs the state interest, and the resulting balance
determines whether the advertiser may continue to "speak."' However,
it was not until Virginia Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,' the next major commercial speech case, that the Court
fully withdrew from the Chrestensen doctrine, and thoroughly entrenched
the "public interest" as the relevant interest to be protected in extending
the First Amendment to commercial speech.'
Virginia Pharmacy is recognized as the high point of protection for
commercial speech.'
Yet, while the Court ultimately extended
protection to purely commercial speech,"l it built on the foundation it had
laid in Pittsburgh Press and Bigelow, and based its protection on grounds
which, were not "cause for celebration."
63. Id. at 822-23.
64. Id. at 827-28.
65. See id. at 822. The Court referred to the information conveyed as being of
value to a "diverse audience" consisting of readers in need of the information, readers
with a curiosity about the laws of another state, and readers seeking reform in Virginia.
Because these groups are successively greater in number, the implication is that the
greater the number of people interested in the information, the greater the interest in
protecting it. Id.
66. See id. By noting that the subject of the advertisement was abortion, which had
been recently held constitutionally protected, the Court indicated that the First
Amendment interest in the content of the speech is, to some extent, linked to whether the
"constitutional interests of the general public" are served by that content. Id.
67. See id. at 827-28.
68. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
69. See supra note 37.
70. See KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 22-23, 57-58.
71. Throughout this note, unless otherwise specified, "purely commercial speech"
refers to the Court's definition of classic commercial speech as speech which does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); see also, KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 18-19
(explaining that the Court adopted its classic definition of commercial speech from
PittsburghPress); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S at 762 (utilizing this definition of purely
commercial speech).
72. HOLTZER, supra note 37, at 71.
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Virginia Pharmacy involved a challenge to a Virginia statute which
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.7'
The specific question for the Court was whether speech which does no

more than communicate the idea "I will sell you the X prescription drug
at the Y price," 74 is "wholly outside the protection of the First
Amendment."'75 The Court had never addressed this type of speech in
any of its opinions. 76
In arriving at this question as the issue to be decided, the Court first
reviewed several settled propositions regarding commercial speech,' and

concluded that it is the content of the speech which will determine whether
it can be regulated.78 The Court then restated the specific issue: "Our
question is whether speech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction,' is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas,'
and from 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, . . . on the

administration of Government,' that it lacks all protection."" The
question focused not on any right of the speaker to convey price
information, but on whether the speech conveys information worthy of
First Amendment protection.' Thus, the Court moved on to explain of
73. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-50.
74. Id. at 761.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 760-61 (explaining that because Bigelow dealt with speech which was
clearly in the public interest, the question whether speech which conveyed nothing but
information regarding a transaction is protected by the First Amendment was still open).
77. See id. at 761. In laying out these settled propositions, the Court was
attempting to focus on the reasons, if any, that commercial speech has been, and could
be, regulated. It did so by eliminating aspects of commercial speech which prior cases
had demonstrated were not proper reasons for its regulation. These settled propositions
are that speech does not lose First Amendment protections merely because: (1) money
is spent to project it; (2) it is sold for profit; or, (3) it involves a solicitation to purchase.
Having eliminated the possible non-content based restrictions on commercial speech, the
Court then concluded that if some reason still existed to regulate commercial speech, it
must be based on the content of such speech. Id.
78. See id. at 761-62. Here the Court narrowed the focus by ruling out certain
aspects of the content of commercial speech which were not dispositive. The Court
concluded that it is not merely the commercial content which will deprive commercial
speech of its protection, because no one would claim that pharmacists should be
prohibited from speaking on the merits of pharmaceuticalprice or advertising regulations.
Nor can the fact that commercial speech is non-editorial and simply conveys factual
information be dispositive, because purely factual material which conveys information
of public interest has been protected. See id.
79. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
80. See HOLZER, supra note 37, at 71-72.
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what that information, and the consequent First Amendment interest, must

consist.
The interest on which the Court focused was that of the consuming
public,81 as represented by the plaintiffs in the action.' The Court
stated that because consumers, especially "the poor, the sick, and
particularly the aged,"' have an interest in drug price advertising,"
"society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information. " ' This societal interest is served by commercial speech
because, in addition to helping consumers obtain badly needed
information, the free flow of commercial information promotes informed
decisionmaking in the economy, efficient resource allocation, and
intelligent decisionmaking with regard to how the economy is regulated,
all of which are indispensable to the public interest."
In addition to outlining society's strong interest in certain types of
commercial speech, the Court pointed to several examples of speech which
it felt had met that interest." Individual advertisements, while entirely
"commercial," may be of "general public interest"88 where they:
indicate that legal abortions are available; I state that a manufacturer of
artificial furs offers his products as an alternative to real furs which can
cause extinction of fur-bearing animals;' or state that a domestic
producer offers his product as an alternative to foreign products which
tend to deprive Americans of jobs.9 ' The Court did not indicate why
these specific examples were in the public interest. It did, however,
belabor the point that society has a great interest in the dissemination of
81. Virginia Phannacy,425 U.S. at 763. The Court demonstrates the importance
of commercial information to the average consumer by pointing out that a particular
consumer's interest in such information "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 763-64.
85. Id. at 764.
86. See id. at 765.

87. See id. at 764.
88. Id.
89. See id. (citing Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809).
90. See id. (citing Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son,
364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
91. See id. (citing Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971)).
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information, commercial or otherwise, and hence, commercial speech
should receive some protection.'
Thus, since the individual interests involved were in accord with the
general interests of society, the Court found the First Amendment interests

in Virginia Pharmacy to be important enough to extend constitutional
protections to purely commercial speech.' The only remaining task was
to weigh this interest against the asserted state interest in upholding the

ban.'
The state interest involved was that of maintaining professionalism

among Virginia pharmacists.9" While the Court considered this interest
to be substantial, 96 it found that the ban on price advertising did not
directly affect the interest.' Because the ban could only directly affect

consumer reaction to prices, any effects on the professional standards of
pharmacists would be incidental, at best." Moreover, the Court was
more concerned with the fact that Virginia was attempting to assert its
interest by maintaining consumer ignorance.' Finding this to be overly
paternalistic, 1" the Court found the state interest to be outweighed and
92. See id. at 765. The general discussion at this point juxtaposed the Court's
apparent desire to justify protecting commercial speech based on its public interest
element with its recognition that such an element would not always be present. The
Court seemed to solve this dilemma by widening the scope of public interest to focus on
the general dissemination of information. "Advertising, however tasteless and excessive
it sometimes may seem," is dissemination of information, and thus serves a societal
interest. Id. So, while the Court seems to have avoided the potential problem of having
to decide which advertising serves the public interest and which does not, it has
nonetheless attempted to do so by inextricably linking the value of advertising to a social
goal. Id. Thus, the following questions remain: What if "society" determines that certain
commercial speech is not dissemination of information? Who decides whether particular
commercial speech does, in fact, disseminate information? Moreover, if the Court
believed that "no line between publicly. . . 'important' commercial [speech] and the
opposite kind could ever be drawn," id., why did it set out examples of publicly
interesting speech in its opinion? See id. at 764-65.
93. See id. at 765.
94. See id. at 766.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 769.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 770:
There is... an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That... is
to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if.. . they are... informed, and that the
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held that
the ban was an unconstitutional restriction on truthful commercial
10 1
speech.
After Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech occupied a place in the
eyes of the First Amendment
which was entirely different from the
°

"casual, almost offhiand"" dismissal it had received almost thirty-five
years earlier. 1" The Court now gave a certain value to commercial
speech which was proportional to its accord with the "general public

interest,"
and then weighed this against the state's interest in restricting
104

it.

2. The First Amendment Interest is Merged:
Virginia Pharmacy to Central Hudson
In the years immediately following Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
made few changes to the commercial speech doctrine."
One
consequence of Virginia Pharmacy, however, was that attorneys began to

assert their own rights to advertise against a host of state bar and
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them ....
But the choice among these alternative approaches is not
ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of
choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its
misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.
Id. At least one commentator has focused on this passage as reason for praising the
opinion as one which emphasized the "primacy of the First Amendment over asserted
state interests. . . [and] a refreshing triumph of principle over relativism." KAPLAR,
supranote 12, at 23. However, the Court's fundamental justification for extending First
Amendment protections to commercial speech is the extent to which such speech accords
with the general public interest. Thus, when the speech no longer serves this interest,
the rationale for protection will no longer exist. See id.
101. See Virginia Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 773.
102. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (Douglas J., concurring)
(referring to the way in which Chrestensen had been decided).
103. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
104. But see KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 22-23 (arguing that the Court's decision in
irginia Pharmacy was a turning point in the constitutional protection afforded
commercial speech. The Court for the first time gave greater weight to the First
Amendment aspects of commercial speech than to the state's interest.).
105. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc. Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977) (reversing a local ban on "For Sale" signs on real estate. As in Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court held that the First Amendment prevented the local authorities from
achieving a stated goal by banning truthful commercial speech.).
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professional regulations which prohibited them from doing so."°
Throughout the attorney advertising cases the Court maintained the
essence of its balancing approach, 7 finding important societal benefits
in allowing attorney advertising," 8 and then balancing those interests
against the asserted state interest in prohibiting the advertising. While
these cases expanded the scope of what the Court considered to be in the
public interest,"° these cases did not significantly change the way in
which the Court treated truthful commercial speech. They did, however,
add to the different ways in which a state may or may not tip the scales
in its favor, and thus helped to set the stage for the next important
commercial speech case.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Services
Commission of New York,1"' the Court considered whether a regulation
which prohibited promotional advertising by an electrical utility was an
unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech."' The Court took the
opportunity to review the prior commercial speech decisions,112 and to
consolidate the existing law into a four-part test with which the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech would be
judged."" In settling on the specific parts of the test, the Court first
reiterated the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech,"1 and the notion that commercial speech enjoys First
Amendment protection because it serves the societal interest of information
dissemination.115 The Court then concluded that "'[tjhe Constitution .
. . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other

constitutionally guaranteed expression.' The protection available for
particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the
106. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496
U.S. 91 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
107. See KAPLAR, supranote 12, at 30.
108. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 376-78 (such benefits include reducing legal costs to
consumers, helping new attorneys to enter the market, and helping in the administration
of justice.).
109. See id.
110. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

111. Id. at 558.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. at 560-61.
See id. at 564.
Id.at 562.
Id. at 561-62.
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expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation." 116
By the "nature of the expression" the Court was referring to its past
decisions in which the First Amendment interest in commercial speech
Thus, where particular speech
consisted of its informational value.'
where it is deceptive or deals
is,
that
does not convey useful information,
with activity which is illegal, there will be no First Amendment interest
in preserving it."'
As the Court put it, "'[tihe First Amendment's concern for
commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising.'
Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression
of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about
The threshold issue thus became: Is the speech
lawful activity.""'
deceptive or misleading? 1 ' If it is, the speech is not protected because
communication more
"[t]he government may ban forms of [commercial]
21
likely to deceive the public than to inform it."
The analysis then turned to the state interest involved, and the second
If the answer is
question became: Is the state interest substantial?'
yes, the regulation will pass constitutional muster only if it directly
advances the state interest," z and is the least restrictive means of
accomplishing that interest. M"
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court noted that there had been
no claim that the advertisements involved were deceptive, and proceeded
to the remaining three parts of the test."z The Court found the state's
interest in energy conservation to be both substantial and directly advanced
by the regulation, and thus moved on to the last part of the test. 12
Here, however, the Court found the regulation to be much broader than
necessary to further the state interest."z The ban acted to prohibit all
promotional advertising, whether or not it had any effect on energy
116. Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
117. Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
See id. at 563-66.
Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
See id. at 564-66.
See id. at 564.

124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. at 565-66.
Id. at 566.
See id. at 568-69.
Id. at 570.
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use.1
Thus, although substantial, the state interest in energy
conservation could not justify suppressing all advertising, including that
which conveyed information which would not cause an increase in energy
consumption."
Commentators have called Central Hudson one of the high points for
commercial speech in the fifty years since Chrestensen."10 And, at first
blush, it would seem true that by codifying its opinions into a four part
test in which the government had to justify its restrictions, the Court had
created a presumption in favor of commercial speech."' However, the
Court's fundamental justification for protecting commercial speech was
still based on the extent to which such speech serves the public
interest."1z Moreover, by creating a standardized test, the Court
eliminated its prior tendency to allocate positive value to commercial
speech and thereby add weight to that side of the scale.'" Instead, the
Court asks only whether the speech is deceptive, that is, whether there is
no negative value, and then focuses completely on whether the state can
tip the scale in its favor."
Thus, as subsequent cases indicate,
commercial
speech
lacked
much
of
its previous protections after Central
Hudson.135
3. The First Amendment Becomes Irrelevant: Posadasand Beyond
The next significant stride in the commercial speech doctrine occurred
in 1986 in PosadasDe Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico." In Posadas, the Court considered whether a regulation which
banned gambling advertising in Puerto Rico was unconstitutional. 37
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. See, e.g., KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 33, 35.
131. See id. at 24.

132. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
133. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 576 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing

the majority's new four-part test for placing undue emphasis on the state's interest instead
of focusing on the principle that "the State may not [pursue its goals] by keeping the
public in ignorance." (alteration in original)).
134. See supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
135. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that
the majority's new four-part test involving an "intermediate level of scrutiny" neither
follows from prior cases, nor provides a sufficient level of protection for commercial

speech).
136. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
137. Id. at 330.
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The Court conducted a straightforward Central Hudson test and
determined that the speech was not deceptive,13 the state had a
substantial interest in reducing the demand for gambling,"' the
regulation clearly advanced the state interest directly," and the
regulation was no broader than necessary to achieve that end.14 What
is significant about Posadas, however, is not how it applied the Central
Hudson test, but what it indicated about the test and about the future of
commercial speech. 42
In an attempt to bring back the values balancing of the pre-Central
Hudson cases, the appellant argued that the advertising was protected
under Bigelow and Carey v. Population Services,' which had struck
down restrictions on abortion clinic and contraceptive advertising,
respectively.'"
In disagreeing, the Court pointed out that in both
Bigelow and Carey the speech was protected only because the underlying
conduct which the speech advertised was protected." 4
In a now
infamous passage, the Court stated its view that "the greater power to
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to
ban advertising of casino gambling, and Carey and Bigelow are hence
inapposite.""
In Carey and Bigelow, the First Amendment interest
strongly favored protecting the speech, but here no such First Amendment
interest existed. The speech, therefore, could be banned. 47 Posadas
indicated that no value would be accorded commercial speech where its
content did not implicate some constitutional or public interest."'
Central Hudson had taken the First Amendment interest in commercial
speech and boiled it down to the threshold question of whether the speech
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 340-41.
See id. at 341.
See id. at 341-42.
See id. at 342-43.
See KAPLAR, supranote 12, at 24-26 (discussing the importance of the Posadas

case).
143. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) and Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)); see also supra notes 55-69 and
accompanying text.

144. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345.
145. See id.at 345-46.
146. Id. at 346.
147. See id.
148. See Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "Twas
Strange, 'Twas PassingStrange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 Sup. CT.
REV. 1, 12-13, 15.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REViEW

[Vol. 39

was deceptive or involved an illegal activity." It thereby eliminated
any remnant of adding weight to the commercial speech as against the
state interest, and concentrated, instead, on whether the state could add
weight to its own interest. Posadas simply drove the nail home."s
Since Posadas, the only significant change in commercial speech law
has been a loosening of the fourth part of the Central Hudson test from
the "least restrictive means" of achieving the state interest, to a
"reasonable fit" between the state interest and the means chosen to effect
that interest. 1 While this certainly makes it easier for the government
to restrict commercial speech, 52 it does not represent the kind of
fundamental change made by the Court in Posadas, nor was it an
unpredictable movement given that change.
B. Deceptive or Potentially Misleading Commercial Speech
Throughout the fifty year history of commercial speech jurisprudence,
the Court has maintained that although some justification exists for
protecting commercial speech, it is absent where the speech is deceptive
or misleading. 53 Because the very reason to protect commercial speech
is its informational value to the public, where it deceives rather than
enlightens, it is without value and is unprotected by the First
Amendment."s Hence, in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court recognized that
"[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected
for its own sake."55 The issue thus became, how to distinguish between
deceptive and nondeceptive speech.
149. See supra notes 119-35 and acompanying text.
150. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
151. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81
(1989). See also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993)
(striking down as unconstitutional a local ordinance that banned news racks containing
commercial handbills but allowed news racks containing newspapers becausethe ban was
not a "reasonable fit" between the city's interest in improving safety and esthetics and
the means chosen to further the interest); KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 27.

152. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-81 (rejecting the "least restrictive means" test as
imposing too heavy a burden on the State).
153. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
154. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 536; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
155. 425 U.S. itt
771.
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Two cases which followed Virginia Pharmacy indicate the difficulty
in answering this question. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona," the
Court considered the constitutionality of a ban on attorney advertising." 7
The State Bar argued that attorney advertising is inherently misleading
because the services are individualized and thus prevent informed
comparison, that the consumer is unable to determine in advance the
services he needs, and that such advertising will fail to indicate the skill
of the attorney. 5
With regard to the first argument, the Court reasoned that attorneys
would be unable to advertise for services which are highly individualized,
because they would be unable to come up with a price before meeting with
the lient.' Thus, the ads would not be misleading unless the attorney
did not stick to the price advertised. 1" The second argument failed
because the Court believed that consumers have an idea of the general
legal services they need before consulting an attorney, and that advertising
presents just such general information.16 Finally, the Court stated that
some information is better than none, and thus the fact that the ads would
fail to indicate the skill level of the attorney was not dispositive. 1 1
Thus, while rejecting the specific arguments, the Court provided little in
the way of positive principles in explaining why attorney advertising is not
inherently misleading."t
It did, however, indicate its displeasure with
the assumption that the "public is not sophisticated enough to realize the
limitations of advertising, [and is] better kept in ignorance than trusted
with correct but incomplete information.""' However, the Court did
not indicate when the information is to be deemed incorrect, or when it is
too incomplete.
In Friedman v. Rogers,1" the Court again provided no clear
principles regarding misleading advertising, but this time it refused to
protect the commercial speech involved. 1"
The case involved a
156. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
157. Id. at 353.

158. See id. at 372.
159. See id. at 372-73.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 374.
162. See id.
163. See Kozinski & Banner, supranote 10, at 635-37 (discussing the difficulty of
determining the truth of commercial speech).
164. Bates, 433 U.S. at 375.
165. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
166. See id. at 19.
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prohibition on the practice of optometry under a trade name. 167 The
Court distinguished trade names from the advertising in Bates on the
grounds that trade names have no "intrinsic meaning,"' and thus
"conveyal no information about the price and nature of the services
offered . . . until [they] acquire[] meaning over a period of time."" 0
The advertising in Bates, on the other hand, was "self contained and self
explanatory."" 7
The Court did not explain why the term "legal
clinic"" in Bates was any more "self explanatory," or had any more
"intrinsic meaning" than did the trade names in Friedman. Nor did the
Court indicate exactly how the trade names were to "acquirel] meaning
over a period of time" if they were not allowed to be used."n
The Court then discussed the potential for abuse if trade names were
allowed to be used,' and concluded that "[e]ven if Rogers' use and
advertising of the trade name were not in fact misleading, they were an
example of the use of a trade name to facilitate the large-scale
commercialization which enhances the opportunity for misleading
practices. " "
Thus, commercial speech that is only potentially
misleading could now be constitutionally restricted. 5 Absent from this
opinion was the Court's former deference to the public's ability to "realize
the limitations of advertising" expressed in Bates. 6 Instead, the Court
seemed to adopt a position similar to that expressed by the State Bar in
Bates, which had assumed that "the public is better kept in ignorance than
trusted with correct but incomplete information."' 7 Why this change
had occurred, or where the line between truthful and deceptive
commercial speech was to be drawn, the Court did not say.
Later the Court revisited the theme from Friedman, holding that
speech could not be regulated simply because it was potentially
misleading."' Edenfield v. Fane 7 involved a Florida Accountancy
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 381.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Friedman, 440 U.S. at 12.
See id. at 13-14.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 15-16.
433 U.S. at 375.

177. Id.
178. See Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct.
2084 (1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
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Board rule that prohibited in-person solicitation of new clients by
CPAs. 180 The Court held that the prohibition violated the free speech
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,"' noting that "a
state may ban commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive
without further justification."'I The Board claimed that the speech here
was potentially misleading because a "CPA who solicits clients 'is
obviously in need of business and may be willing to bend the rules.'" 8 3
The Court reasoned that although there are detrimental aspects of inperson, commercial solicitation in certain circumstances, these detriments
are "not so inherent" as to deny First Amendment protection to the
activity.'
Here, Fane wanted only to "communicate . . . truthful,
nondeceptive information proposing a lawful commercial transaction.""
This complete prohibition of the activity encompassed truthful speech as
well as potentially misleading speech."
When this result occurs, the
state must establish that the restriction serves a state interest and is tailored
to advance that interest.'8 The State here asserted three interests: 1)
prevention of fraud, 2) protection of privacy, and 3) maintenance of CPA
independence."' However, the State failed to establish that a total ban
of the activity would directly advance those interests and the rule was
struck down as unconstitutional.1 9
In Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation,"9 the titles "CPA" and "CFP" appeared next to plaintiff's
name on her business cards, stationery, and Yellow Pages listing. 19
The Florida Accountancy Board reprimanded her for engaging in "'false,
deceptive, and misleading' advertising." ' The Board asserted that the
179. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
180. See id. at 1796.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 1799.
Id. at 1797 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1799.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.

ld.
Id. at 1801.
114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994).
Id. at 2086.
Id. at 2087 (citation omitted).
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"CFP" designation was misleading,1 " claiming that "any designation
using the term 'certified' to refer to a certifying organization other than
the Board itself.
'inherently nislead[s] the public into believing that
State approval
. exists.'"
As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
preferred the full disclosure route, reiterating that "only deceptive, or
misleading commercial speech may be banned."195 Perhaps fearing the
slippery slope, the Court held that it could not permit the "rote invocation
of the words 'potentially misleading.'""

Because the Board could not

substantiate its claim that the "CFP" designation would mislead rather
than inform, its reprimand of Ibanez could not stand." 9
Although the Court offered no principles for determining what was
"deceptive" or "misleading," it has provided an indication as to which
way it might lean in certain cases. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.," the Court considered the constitutionality of a restriction on
advertisements for contraceptives. 11 In determining whether the ads
were deceptive, the Court stated that
[t]o the contrary, advertising for contraceptives not only
implicates 'substantial ...

and societal interests' in the free flow

of... information, but also relates to activity which is protected
from unwarranted state interference.... [Thus, this] commercial
speech is ... clearly protected by the First Amendment. Indeed,
where . . . a speaker desires to convey truthful information

relevant to important social issues such as family planning and
prevention of venereal disease, we have previously found the
First Amendment interest served by such speech paramount.m
The implication of this language is that the Court will consider the
societal interest served by the speech in determining whether the speech
is misleading. Thus, while the Court has refused to delineate any
principles related to "deceptive" or "misleading," and has all but
193. Id. at 2088. The Board also asserted that the CPA designation was misleading
becauseplaintiff denied the Board's jurisdiction over her, which rendered the designation
meaningless. However, this argument is inconsequential because Ibanez later admitted
she was under the Board's jurisdiction. See id.

194. Id. (citation omitted).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id. at 2090.
See id. at 2090-92.
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Id. at 61.
Id. at 69 (citation omitted).
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contradicted itself in its own assessment of these attributes, there may be
a governing tendency in the resolution of this question. In any case, the
conflicting signals the Court has sent are no comfort to advertisers and
businesses which require some predictability to determine what they can
and cannot express in commercial speech.
I. ANALYsIs
This section will summarize the case law traced in the preceding
section in an attempt to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has created
a balancing test for commercial speech restrictions in which the
public/government interest occupies both sides of the scale. Part IV will
then critically analyze this approach in an attempt to expose its weakness
as a safeguard for First Amendment freedoms.
Commercial speech emerged from Valentine v. Chrestensen 1 with
neither an adequate definition nor a theoretical justification.'
Indeed,
as Justice Douglas recognized not long thereafter, the case had been
decided in a "casual, almost offhand" way and "ha[d] not survived
reflection."'
Yet, instead of discarding it as poorly decided and ad
hoe, the Court retained the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy and
began to build a theoretical structure around it.'
In Pittsburgh Press' and Bigelow,'
its first significant
commercial speech cases since it had begun to rethink the doctrine, the
Court characterized the issue as one in which commercial speech must
serve some First Amendment interest in order to receive protection.'
The Court then proceeded to define this interest in terms of the public
interest and constitutional interest elements of the speech.'
The clear
implication was that the greater the public or societal interest served, the
201. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
202. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.

203. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
204. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 10, at 628.
205. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
206. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
207. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389 (stating that the First Amendment
interest which might be served by advertising is absent where the subject matter of the
advertisement is restricted); Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821-22 (distinguishing the speech in
Chrestensen,which merely proposed a commercial transaction, from commercial speech
which serves an important public interest).
208. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822, and supra text accompanying note 61.
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greater the First Amendment interest, and thus the more likely that the
speech would receive protection.'
When the Court placed its last clarifying touches on the First
Amendment interest, in Virginia Pharmacy,210 it had thoroughly
entrenched a utilitarian justification for commercial speech.'
The First
Amendment interest had been defined effectively as the public
interest,212 and that interest was then balanced against the state interest
to determine whether freedom of commercial speech would prevail.213
Thus, at this point, the protection of particular commercial speech
depended on the value the Court accorded it based on its public interest
element. Indeed, in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court went as far as 21
to4
provide examples of commercial speech which had met this interest.
Essentially, then, in balancing the speech's First Amendment interest
against the state interest, the Court would proceed to add weight to the
speech side of the scale as it found utilitarian benefits in protecting the
speech. In Virginia Pharmacy, these benefits consisted of the commercial
speech's informational value to the public, which resulted in a host of
other benefits. 1 5 Thus, during the Virginia Pharmacy period, the scale
21 6
was tipped, albeit slightly, in favor of protecting commercial speech.
In Central Hudson, 2 7 however, the Court consolidated its
commercial speech cases and abandoned its tendency to add value to the
speech side of the equation.21 8 When the Court reviewed its prior cases
to form its four part test, it recognized that the First Amendment interest
in commercial speech lay solely in its informational value to the
public.2 9 Thus, the Court consolidated its prior examination of the
value of commercial speech into one question: Is the speech
209. See supra notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
210. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

211. See id.
212. See id. at 763-64; see also supranotes 81-104 and accompanying text.

213. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766; see also supra notes 94-109 and
accompanying text.

214. 425 U.S. at 764.
215. See id. at 763-64.
216. See KAPLAR, supra note 12, at 22, 23 n.40.
217. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
218. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text; see also KAPLAR supra note
12, at 23 n.40 (stating that protections for commercial speech decreased between Virginia
Pharmacyand Central Hudson).

219. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-63.
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misleading?
From here the emphasis shifted to whether the state
could add weight to its side of the scale of value."
This shift in

emphasis set the stage for Posadas.'
The Posadas case was the inevitable final step in the commercial
speech doctrine. For fifty years the Court had carefully crafted a body of
law which was supposed to recognize the "commonsense difference"'

between commercial and noncommercial speech, assign a value to
commercial
speech according to the public interest it served, and still
maintain some
level of protection.'
In one case, however, the false
wall between public interest and state interest crumbled, and the First
Amendment was lost in the process. The irony of the Posadas case is that
it is entirely consistent with precedent.'
Previous cases had taken pains to root the First Amendment interest
of commercial speech in the public interest.'

Posadas merely drove

this point home by holding that where there is no public interest in the
220. See id. at 563, 566.
221. See id. at 564, 566; see also id. at 576 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing
the majority's new intermediate scrutiny analysis for weighing the state's interest in
regulating speech, and abandoning the more principled approach taken in Virginia
Pharmacy);supranotes 119-35 and accompanying text.
222. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579 (Blackmun, J., concurring):
It appears that the Court would permit the State to ban all direct advertising
of air conditioning, assuming that a more limited restriction on advertising
would not effectively deter the public from cooling its homes. In my view,
our cases do not support this type of suppression. If a governmental unit
believes that use or overuse of air conditioning is a serious problem, it must
attack the problem directly, by prohibiting air conditioning or regulating
thermostat levels.

Just as . . . Virginia may promote professionalism of

pharmacists directly, so too New York may not promote energy conservation
"by keeping the public in ignorance."
Id. (citation omitted). Interestingly, what Justice Blackmun complained of in Central
Hudson is exactly what occurred in Posadas. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 344. There the
Court upheld a ban on casino advertising, despite the fact that the gambling itself was
legal. Id. at 344. Thus, the Court allowed the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to achieve
its purpose indirectly by "[k]eep[ingl the people of Puerto Rico in ignorance." Kurland,
supra note 148, at 9-11.
223. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
224. See supra Part II.
225. See Michael Carvin, CommercialFree Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 41
RuTCIERS L. Rav. 719, 730-37 (1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's commercial
speech doctrine).
226. See, e.g., Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809; VirginiaPharmacy, 425 U.S. 748; see also
supra notes 42-135 and accompanying text.
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subject matter of the commercial speech, there is no First Amendment
interest, and the speech can be regulated freely.'
In the relevant passage of the opinion, the Court concluded that "the
greater power to ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban advertising of casino gambling."'
The Court arrived at
this conclusion by recognizing the fundamental distinction between
Posadas and Bigelow.'
In Bigelow, the Court had reasoned that the

commercial speech was in the public interest, in the constitutional interest,
and therefore in the First Amendment interest.'
In Posadas, the Court
simply made the logical negative inference from this and reasoned that

advertising about gambling was not in the public interest, not in the
constitutional
interest, and therefore not in the First Amendment
31
interest.2
Because the purpose of government is to maintain the public order and
to protect its citizens, the state interest amounts to little more than a de

facto public interest. The state protects the public interest. Thus, where
the public interest in a particular activity is minimal, and that activity is
deemed harmful in some way to the public, the state will have a
significant interest in regulating it.2

In this way, the state's interest in

regulating increases as the public's interest in the regulated activity
diminishes. Thus, in Posadas, there was a substantial state interest in
regulating gambling because the Court had decided that there was an

insubstantial public interest in it, and the door was opened to regulating
advertising about gambling.'
227. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346; see also Kurland, supra note 148, at 12-13
(stating that under the Court's reasoning in Posadas, because gambling enjoys no
constitutional protection, as did the subject of the speech in Carey and Bigelow,
advertising of it could be banned).
228. Posadas,478 U.S. at 345-46.
229. See id. at 345.
230. 421 U.S. at 822.
231. See 478 U.S. at 345-46; see also supranotes 145-52 and accompanying text.
232. See U.S. v. Edge, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (holding unconstitutional a federal
statute which prohibited the broadcasting of lottery advertisements by broadcasters
licensed in states where lotteries were banned. Although the Court based its decision on
balancing the interests of states that allowed lotteries and the interests of states that
banned them, the Court emphasized the minimal public Literest in gambling and the
promotion of gambling. Thus, the Court was able to discount the First Amendment
interest and base its holding on the substantial government interest in regulating lottery
advertisements.).
233. See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
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As far as First Amendment theory goes, Posadas did little more than
simply align the case law with its underlying rationale.'
If the First
Amendment interest, in the context of commercial speech, is merely the
Court's view of the public interest, it is no surprise that the Court permits
regulation of whatever it feels does not accord with that interest. The
balancing tests and intermediate level scrutiny have thus become secondary
to the more important question: what is in the public interest?
This is more apparent when one considers Posadasin light of the four
parts of the Central Hudson test. The Court found the state's purpose to
reduce the demand for casino gambling by residents of Puerto Rico to be
substantial,' yet it seemed unconcerned with the obvious contention
that any problems associated with gambling among residents would also
be present when gambling exists among tourists.I Moreover, why
would reducing demand for casino gambling solve anything when there are
a host of other types of gambling which are allowed to continue
unabated?' 7 The Court's approval of this state purpose seems hardly
to accord with its admonition in Virginia Pharmacy that states should not
attempt to achieve their purposes by keeping the public in ignorance."
On the final two steps of the Central Hudson test, the tightness of fit
between means and ends, the Court was satisfied that the legislature
reasonably believed the ban would further the state interest, 239 and that
a statute any more narrowly tailored would require a total ban on casino
gambling.'
This, the Court stated, would "surely be a Pyrrhic victory
for casino owners."" 1 Thus, the Court was concerned that holding a
ban on advertising unconstitutional might force the Puerto Rican
legislature to ban casino gambling itself. This was unacceptable for the
Court at least partly because it would foil the purpose of casino owners in
bringing the suit in the first place. 2 If there was ever any question as
to who bears the real burden in a commercial speech case, Posadas erased
any doubt that it is the speaker and not the state.
234. See supra Part II.A.3.
235. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
236. See Kurland, supranote 148, at 8.

237. See id.
238. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-70; see also Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 576 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating the governing principle of Virginia
Pharmacyas "the State 'may not [pursue its goals] by keeping the public in ignorance.'")
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
239. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.

240. Id.
241. Id. at 346.
242. See id.
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The significant question in commercial speech cases thus becomes,
what is the public interested in hearing? For the Court, at least, the flip
side of this question becomes, what is the state interested in regulating?
The answers to these questions are anyone's guess.'
While the Court
has provided its own views of the public and state interest, as Posadas
demonstrated,' First Amendment protections which are based on these
views are tenuous.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

Obviously, there remain certain protections for commercial
speech.'
The Court, however, while purportipg to uphold the value
of free and open dissemination of information,' is proceeding on an
underlying theory which places the First Amendment freedoms of
commercial speech on the capricious foundation of the public interest.'
This section will outline some of the implications this has for the future
of commercial speech.
The immediate upshot of the Posadas decision is that the government
can ban advertising for any activity which itself could be banned.2
The implications for alcohol and tobacco advertising are obvious, and the
243. See, e.g., Kurland, supranote 148, at 15 ("We cannot know what the courts
will determine to be immoral until they tell us. Is gambling immoral? Only casino
gambling? Is wine drinking immoral? . . . If immorality is to be the guide to
legitimating censorship, we have entered on a long and rocky road indeed."). Id.
244. See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
245. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of 111., 496 U.S. 91,
99-111 (1990) (reversing a public censure of an attorney who stated on his letterhead that
he was a certified trial specialist and holding that the attorney had a First Amendment
right to advertise his certification as a trial specialist. The Court announced that a state
may not prohibit potentially misleading information if the information can be conveyed
in a truthful manner.); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 113 S. Ct.
1505, 1511-16 (1993) (holding that a local ordinance banning the distribution of
commercial handbills in newsstands was unconstitutional. The Court found that truthful
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection and that "Cincinnati's
categorical ban on commercial newsracks place[d] too much emphasis on the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech." Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
Cincinnati could not further its interest in cleanliness and public safety by banning
commercial handbills where there was no relevant difference between newspapers and
commercial handbills in advancing the city's interest.).
246. See supra Part ll.A.1.
247. See supranotes 136-52 and accompanying text; see also U.S. v. Edge, 113
S. Ct. 2696, 2703-08 (1993).
248. See KAPLAR, supranote 12, at 27.
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Court, in Posadas, even alluded to this in a footnote. 9 However, the
implications of the commercial speech doctrine go beyond advertising for
alcohol and tobacco, and other such "vices." In recent years we have
seen an increase in the tendency of businesses to promote their products
and their industries in more editorial fashion and merge commercial and
noncommercial speech.'
In addition, current public debate rages over
issues such as the environment in which there are great commercial, as
well as societal, interests involved." As the intensity of these debates
increases, and the lines between commercial and noncommercial speech
become blurred, 2 it will become more difficult, if not impossible, for
the Court to determine exactly which side carries the public interest. As
a result, First Amendment freedoms will suffer.
One case highlights this problem. National Commission on Egg
Nutrition v. FTC! 3 involved a prohibition by the FTC on advertisements
run by the appellants which challenged the notion that eating eggs
increases the risk of heart disease.'
The FTC claimed that the
advertisements were false and misleading in that they implied that there
was no scientific evidence linking cholesterol and heart disease.' 5 The
appellants contended that their ads simply questioned the validity of such
evidence.'
After agreeing that the ads carried the implication that the
FTC claimed,' the Seventh Circuit considered the appellants' argument
that the ads were protected as commercial speech under Virginia
Pharmacy.5
In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that
Virginia Pharmacy protected speech only in so far as it had informational
value to the public, and that the holding there allows the government to
regulate false and misleading commercial speech. 9 Having found the
249. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 347 n.10.
250. See generally Howell A. Burkbalter, Advertorial Advertising and the
CommercialSpeech Doctrine, 25 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 861 (1990) (discussing growing
trend in advertising that mixes a public interest message with corporate promotion).

251. See DIxm LEE RAY & Lou Guzzo, TRAsmNO THE PLANET 22 (1989).
252. See id.; see also Kozinskd & Banner, supra note 10, at 637.
253. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
254. Id. at 158.

255. Id. at 161.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 162.

259. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

ads to be potentially false and misleading, the court held them to be
unprotected by the First Amendment.20
This case illustrates the questions raised by the commercial speech
doctrine. To what extent can a court determine whether particular speech
is potentially misleading? Should courts be allowed to make such "highly
paternalistic"" t determinations, or should we be confident, like the
Virginia Pharmacy Court, that "people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means
to that end
is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them"?' 2
The current environmental debate makes these questions all the more
important.'
Several large companies have chosen to challenge many
claims made by environmentalists in ads much like the one involved in the
Egg Nutrition case.' Are scientific findings regarding the environment
any more or less certain than those regarding cholesterol and heart
disease? Which side constitutes the public interest, those who wish to
clean up the environment, or those who wish to debate whether the
environment even needs cleaning up? A case decided in Federal Court
in California pitted a group of advertisers against the State of California
regarding a statute prohibiting the use of certain environmentally-related
terms except as defined by the statute.'
The plaintiff advertisers
claimed that these definitions were arbitrary and subject to different
interpretations in different contexts.'
On whose side is the public
interest in such a case? Does the public have an interest in information
regarding environmental claims which it is unlikely, given the uncertainty
of much of the science, anyone can prove or disprove?
One final question raised by the Posadas case is the extent to which
government can prohibit commercial speech on the merits or demerits of
260. Id. at 163.
261. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Comsumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976).
262. Id. at 770.
263. See Burkhalter, supranote 250, at 871.
264. Id.
265. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lundgren, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N. D.
Cal. 1992) (holding that a California statute that mandates statutory definitions for
commonly used environmental terms in advertisements is a permissible restriction on
commercial speech. The court reasoned that the strong public interest in protecting
consumers from being misled by advertising claims justified the state's regulation.
Furthermore, the regulation survived constitutional scrutiny because it substantially
advanced the public interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve the State's goal.).
266. See id.
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regulations concerning the environment. 7 The government can ban a
whole host of chemicals, products, and processes deemed harmful to the
environment.'
As a result of Posadas, will the government have the
power to ban the "lesser right" of advertising about those products? It is
difficult to draw the line between commercial and noncommercial speech
when industry engages in editorializing about its products.'
Where
courts consider such editorializing to be commercial speech, as they did
in the Egg Nutrition case, will such speech be subject to prohibition?
The point here is not to claim that First Amendment protection for
commercial speech is literally on the verge of extinction, but to point out
the questions and uncertainties inherent in an approach which finds its
very justification in vague notions of the public interest.
V. CONCLUSION

During the formative years of the modem commercial speech
doctrine, Justice Douglas foresaw some of the potential problems of an
unprincipled approach to the First Amendment when, in a dissenting
opinion in PittsburghPress, he wrote:
[W]e have witnessed a growing tendency to cut down the literal
requirements of First Amendment freedoms so that those in power
can squelch someone out of step. Historically, the miscreant has
usually been an unpopular minority. Today it is a newspaper that
does not bow to the spreading bureaucracy that promises to engulf
us. It may be that we have become so stereotyped as to have
earned that fate. But the First Amendment presupposes freewheeling, independent people whose vagaries include ideas spread
across the entire spectrum of thoughts and beliefs. I would let
any expression in that broad spectrum flourish, unrestrained by
Government, unless it was an integral part of action-the only
point which in the Jeffersonian philosophy marks the permissible
point of governmental intrusion.?
This passage captures the spirit of the First Amendment and lays bare the
problem inherent in the Supreme Court's approach to commercial speech.
From the very beginning, the Court attempted to fit commercial speech
neatly into an exclusive and singular category, and to protect it only to the
267.
268.
269.
270.
376, 399

See KAPILAR, supra note 12, at 27.
See RAY & Guzzo, supra note 251, at 22.
See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 10, at 641-44.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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extent it served some societal purpose. Yet, as this note has attempted to
demonstrate, that approach has effectively rendered the First Amendment
irrelevant as a proscription on government regulation. To the extent that
this country has a government "of the people, by the people, and for the
people," the public is the government. What protections, therefore, are
offered by a balancing test that pits the public interest against the
governmental interest?
If the courts are to enforce the spirit of the First Amendment and to
protect free speech as a right, rather than as a privilege, they must take
a more principled stance toward all speech. Only then will the protections
offered by the First Amendment be secure.
Steven M. Simpson

